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Miller qualifies his assertions by writing that he actually “do[es] not believe 
in telepathic foreshadowings,” he is unable to abandon this thesis: “it almost 
seems as though Kafka must have had some occult telepathic premonition of 
what the genocide would be like, though he got the details sometimes a little 
garbled” (65). The “almost” invokes the precarious language of analogy; there 
is a resemblance that Miller as a post-Holocaust reader finds, but an anal-
ogy is not an identity. As Bernstein argues, history is not predetermined; the 
Holocaust did not have to happen. Had it not happened, would we still insist 
that Kafka’s work obscurely foreshadowed what nearly happened? 
Adr ienne Ker tzer
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World War II was a watershed. Before, European colonial states in Africa, 
Asia, and the Caribbean; after, anti-colonial struggles culminating in de-
colonization. During the conflicts, subaltern intellectuals gave voice to the 
colonized’s yearning for collective self-determination, a yearning eventually 
satiated, the story goes, with decolonization. Newly independent, postcolo-
nial states started fulfilling the promises of decolonization with moderniza-
tion projects and policies designed to conserve the cultural heritage. To do so, 
they borrowed, often at usurious rates of interest. To finance these loans, they 
submitted to ruinous debt repayment regimes. Local production virtually 
asphyxiated by the imposed lifting of import restrictions, national econo-
mies collapsed. Those who could (skilled professionals and the educated) fled, 
most to Europe and North America, where a few entered the Academy. But 
access to the Academy, like emigration, exacted a price. At the level of the 
Postcolonial Studies curriculum, coming to terms with structuralist and post-
structuralist theories entailed substituting hybridity and multiculturalism for 
foundational concepts of anti–colonial discourse such as the nation. At the 
level of ethics, it meant disengaging one’s pedagogical practices and schol-
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arly projects from ongoing struggles in the postcolony, including resistance 
against transnational capital. In the Canadian vernacular, it meant refusing to 
dance with the one what brung you. 
For Rumina Sethi, this refusal, this ideological disengagement from the 
postcolony, has been costly for Postcolonial Studies. For one thing, it has 
spawned a cadre of academic “celebrities” whose suspect analyses of postco-
lonial life are cast in the opaque idiom of “‘high’ theory” (9). For another, 
having successfully challenged the essentialist notions of national identity 
that anchored struggles against colonial governance—for example, the 
stable, unchanging, and even primordial ethnic self—and having in some 
quarters even declared the nation-state itself irrelevant to the Empire of 
transnational finance capital, it has failed spectacularly to come to terms 
with the fact that the postcolonial nation remains, in fact, the site and 
object of the ongoing contest between globalization and its discontents. 
For Postcolonial Studies, the consequence has been ideological and political 
paralysis. So what to do? Give Postcolonial Studies “a historical-materialist 
twist” (123), Sethi recommends, returning to the nation and the tradition 
of activist scholarship that made national liberation possible. In short, Back 
to the Future! The Politics of Postcolonialism exemplifies this slogan as critical 
practice.
In part, this return to the past entails historical memory. Beginning with 
nineteenth-century pluralism (Herder), Sethi draws attention to the geopo-
litical and economic forces at work when Postcolonial Studies was emerg-
ing as an academic discipline in the West: the post-Cold War ascendancy 
of the United States as a hyper power, the rise of monetary institutions (the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and trade regulatory 
agencies (GATT, WTO), and postcolonial nations’ loss of economic sov-
ereignty. She links them with the poststructuralist assaults on foundational 
concepts such as “origin,” “truth,” essence, and the referential capacity of sym-
bols, assaults that inspired the discipline to break with Marxism, abandoning 
the emancipatory ethos that had animated anti-colonialist discourse (Fanon, 
Senghor, Gandhi, etc.). She denies neither that the analytical methods of 
“high theory” vary nor that some of its insights (for example, the unintended 
material effects of colonial governance, such as cultural contamination and 
synthesis) are valuable. But she does insist that, on balance, it has stripped 
Postcolonial Studies of its “rigour and radicalism” (59) and enervated its ped-
agogy. Nor is she more generous in her critique of “postcolonial” studies of 
US society and culture. For her, postcolonialism has a very specific historical 
reference: growing out of the 1955 Bandung Conference of non-aligned na-
tions, it refers to “a radical philosophy that promised not only to expose the 
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ways and means by which territory and sensibility are colonized but also to 
show how knowledge itself is a form of colonialism” (103).
This is not to suggest that the return Sethi that proposes is, at its core, nos-
talgic. Rather, it is to show that it is methodological. Her aim is to outline a 
modality for producing what we might call an activist analysis of postcolonial 
phenomena. The keyword in her method is grafting. By “grafting … postco-
lonialism onto Marxist principles,” we will again be able to understand “both 
structures of power and the means of resistance” (21; emphasis added). This 
horticultural metaphor means setting aside the teleological narrative of the 
nation as the imaginative horizon of decolonization for one which recognizes 
that the nation is “the major living political reality” (26) of our times and the 
site of the ongoing conflict between globalization and its discontents. Thus, 
her vigorous repudiation of the “end of the nation” hypothesis elaborated by 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire (2000). Her repudiation will 
likely find favour with those whose national borders have been fortified, like 
those living near the US-Mexico border or passengers holding non-European 
passports, like Ngugi wa Thiong’o on Virgin Atlantic’s Nairobi-London flight 
5672 in December 2010. To paraphrase Mark Twain, though the nation-state 
may have been reduced to a “market unit,” rumours of its demise are much 
exaggerated. Indeed, it is so vital that, far from abolishing it, transnational 
corporations use it to deploy their liberal “free market” ideology against the 
collective national interests of its own peoples.
To recuperate the activist heritage of Postcolonial Studies and restore its 
link with “the world outside the academy” (111), Sethi proposes that we 
rethink the wholesale dismissal of the nation as a category of analysis, re-
visit the critique of binary thinking, and undertake empiricist analyses of 
migrant communities in nations of metropolitan capitalism. By so doing, we 
will become better attuned to the voices of proponents and opponents of glo-
balization. Occasionally given to redundancy, The Politics of Postcolonialism 
nonetheless offers a bracing reconception of the postcolonial nation-state. 
Focusing almost exclusively on globalization, however, it fails to provide a 
critical analysis of the role that local politics and kleptocratic regimes play in 
delegitimating the postcolonial nation–state and discrediting its authority. 
For that, perhaps, another book.
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